Prof Oberst's statement at Rights briefing
[TamilNet, Friday, 29 July 2005, 00:53 GMT]
Full text of the statement Prof Oberst gave during the Members' briefing organized by the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on 27 July 2005 at Rayburn Building in Washington D.C follows:
I would like to make a couple of brief observations about the process of
Tsunami relief and reconstruction.
First, as is very obvious, the process has progressed at a very slow
pace. This slowness is the result of many factors but the most
important are the political factors – manmade impediments placed in the
way of relief aid and reconstruction.
The political impediments are largely a result of the Sri Lankan peace
process. The Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka
and the LTTE placed the LTTE in an ambiguous position. The agreement
placed them administratively in charge of the areas of Sri Lanka that
they controlled at the time of the agreement. However, they did not
have statutory authority to exercise that administration.
The Tsunami thrust this problem into our collective awareness. The
problem had to be resolved before relief and reconstruction aid could
adequately flow to the victims of the disaster. (There is another part
of the problem which has been the general neglect and apathy of
successive Sri Lanka governments toward the eastern province, but that
is another issue.) Thus, there was a urgent need for the P-TOMS.
The Tsunami provided the enemies of the ceasefire agreement (or any
agreement with the LTTE) with a unique opportunity to sabotage the peace
process and the ceasefire agreement. If the P-TOMS, or some other
mechanism, was not implemented to provide assistance, the peace process
would come to a stop.
These opponents of the peace process and the P-TOMS are very powerful.
Their power has been amplified by the inclusion of the Maoist JVP (the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) in the coalition government of President
Kumaratunga. In order to regain power in the 2004 elections, she made
an alliance with the party. When the government agreed to the P-TOMS,
the JVP left the coalition government and, as a result, the government
no longer has a parliamentary majority. It is a very fragile government
and President Kumaratunga will do whatever is necessary to keep it alive.
With this in mind, I would like to make a couple of strong
recommendations about what is going on.
1. First of all, there is a need to promote and protect the P-TOMS and
by so doing, protect the peace process.
2. Secondly, this requires support for President Kumaratunga and her
minority government until such time as there is a new election.
3. Thirdly, there is a need to re-examine the role of the U.S. The
U.S. government has been restricted and limited by current laws. It has
been unable to provide full support to the P-TOMS and the peace process.
(And, as I have argued in the past, has been a hindrance to the peace
process.) The current position of the government, as expressed by
Ambassador Lunstead reflects the problem--we can not contribute funds to
the P-TOMS process but we support other nations doing so.
There is no question that the LTTE has committed actions which are
indefensible in a democratic society, However, Sri Lanka is engaged in a
peace process to end a very bloody and disruptive civil war. We should
support their efforts to end the war. The government engagement has led
them to negotiate and communicate with the LTTE. It has also led them
to a point where the members of the LTTE are allowed to travel in
government territory and to carry out political activities.
The irony of this process is that while the target of LTTE attacks (the
Sri Lankan Government) has agreed to talk with and interact with the
LTTE, the U.S. government (who has not been a target of any attacks)
continues to refuse to communicate with the LTTE or to act in a positive
manner in the peace process.
In the end, the peace process should be an important goal of U.S.
foreign policy. The added burden of the humanitarian and moral
responsibility of the U.S. government to do all within its power to
assist the rehabilitation of the tsunami victims should also be
vigorously pursued. At the current time, the U.S. can not fully pursue
either of these goals – constrained by a law which treats anyone who
lives in LTTE controlled territory (babies and tsunami victims) as
terrorists. A choice must me made – whether to support a peace process
which is floundering and whether to provide humanitarian aid to the
victims of the greatest natural disaster of our lives or to allow
politics to interfere with these goals.
Robert C. Oberst
Professor of Political Science
Nebraska Wesleyan University