A comfortable blackout

[TamilNet, Monday, 16 February 1998, 23:59 GMT]
The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE is being fought behind one of the most comprehensive news blackouts of recent times. The Sri Lankan government has been able to strictly control information coming out of the war zone with considerable success and without drawing much international criticism of the censorship. Sri Lanka's success stems from following a simple but effective strategy that has proved successful elsewhere.

It has been widely recognised that the news coverage of a conflict can itself influence the final outcome. The conflict in Vietnam is a case in point. Hence, the ability to control information about -all aspects of- a conflict is a vital part of modern war strategy. Even accepted democracies have implemented censorship in their military undertakings, albeit with vary degrees of subtlety.

Britain, for example, used a sophisticated system of 'information management' during the Falklands conflict in 1982. Although not immediately apparent at the time, the British Ministry of Defence finely controlled what the British public (and the world) knew about the battle at any time.

To this end, the British MoD suppressed information that could have adversely affected public opinion of the war, promoted information that would help its campaign - whilst at the same time maintaining the impression it was doing its best to be open about the conflict.

Sri Lanka is attempting to repeat the Britain's success, though with more draconian measures.

Just like Britain in the Falklands, the Sri Lankan government has some fundamental advantages. The most basic of these is complete - and exclusive- control of access to the war zones. The isolation of an island, combined with control of the surrounding sea routes contributes to this.

No journalists can legitimately - and safely- enter the affected areas without permission. The Indian government protested when some Indian journalists who crossed into LTTE held areas recently were harassed by Sri Lankan military. Along with these existing confines, the Sri Lankan government ensures that only 'suitable' correspondents enter the war zone. Impartial or neutral correspondents are discreetly left out.

Similarly, when the British task force sailed into the South Atlantic, only British correspondents went with it - to report on their nation's conflict to the world.

Even the 'local' correspondents are selected. Often, given the naturally nationalist tendencies of local correspondents the reporting reflects the government's version of the war situation. Correspondents who might give other than 'positive' view of the conflict or are from publications opposed to the war are specifically but discreetly kept out. Whereas the British government allowed reporters to accompany the task force and witness the fighting for themselves - allowing them the option of writing what they wished after leaving the war zone, the Sri Lankan government largely keeps correspondents out of the battle fronts altogether, and supplies 'news' about the war by a series of press releases. The British MoD also issued press releases in London - for the benefit of foreign correspondents primarily. The press releases contained information that - by its very nature - was intended to support (or protect) the war effort. This often involves telling lies. For example, the British MoD denied that the aircraft carrier Invincible suffered a damage shortly after setting sail from Britain. It subsequently admitted that this had been true.

The Sri Lankan MoD often issues press releases stating that SLAF aircraft had either attacked LTTE bases or ships. Sometimes, pictures of the supposed targets are released as 'proof'. Paradoxically, at the same, SLAF flights to the east of the island are known to have been seriously reduced - the banks there ran out of cash supplies (usually delivered by air) recently - due to an LTTE missile threat.

When the LTTE stormed the SLA's Paranthan base in January 1997, the SLA emphatically denied that the camp had fallen or that its artillery pieces had been destroyed by the LTTE - it said its own troops had destroyed the guns to prevent the LTTE from capturing them.

Subsequent video footage released by the LTTE shows the Tigers not only capturing the artillery, but firing several salvoes at the SLA's nearby Elephant Pass camp before destroying the guns.

The suppression of news from the battlefield is another important part of 'managing the information'. A lot of the information that British censors cut from news reports were said to have been of little value to the Argentineans, but which would have influenced public sentiment (particularly news and images of casualties).

Whilst a lot of the censored news later became public information when the British journalists returned, in Sri Lanka, a lot of the information that is suppressed may be too damaging - details of human rights violations, civilian casualties, etc. to release at all.

The Sri Lankan military is particularly fascinated by casualty figures. It has learnt that a Sinhalese public aghast at reports of heavy - even massive - SLA casualties can be placated by the simple expedient of reporting heavier LTTE casualties.

The British MoD released 'bad news' in drips and drabs, ensuring the extent of the losses (however much was meant to be known publicly) only emerged gradually, allowing the public to adjust to it.

The Sri Lankan military takes a similar approach, announcing the occurrence of a major engagement first - without heavy casualty figures, then announcing the deaths of a handful of soldiers - with a warning of 'possibly heavier losses' and then gradually increasing the number of casualties to an acceptable - and hopefully plausible - level, whilst unabashedly increasing the number of Tiger casualties in parallel.

So what of the independents: those publications which report news 'as it happened', or refuse to support the government's (i.e. the nation's) stand? Apart from denying their correspondents access - as much as possible - the government will need to 'neutralise' their impact as a whole. This usually implies discrediting them by casting doubts on the veracity of their reports, or more importantly on their 'loyalty'.

The British MoD told the British press that it should help in 'leading or steadying public opinion in times of national crisis or stress'. The Sri Lankan Defence minister instructed the Sri Lankan press of the same in early 1995.

Most Sri Lankan publications go along with the edict. For some, it is even a matter of editorial policy. The most loyal publications even attack others who were seen as 'going too far' in being objective. Publications who do not support or oppose the government's line are accused of assisting the enemy, even of treason. During the Falkland's campaign, even the BBC, itself a part of the British establishment, was accused of 'damaging the country's war efforts' by some zealous quarters.

As Phillip Knightly, a veteran British correspondent noted, "The Falklands provided a model of how to make certain that government policy is not undermined by the way a war is reported. The rules turned out to be fairly simple: control access to fighting; exclude neutral correspondents; censor your own; and muster support, both on the field and at home, in the name of patriotism, labelling any dissidents as traitors."

The Sri Lanka censorship applied to war zone in the north and east of the island conceals information that is central to the conflict. Human rights violations, the number of refugees, the distribution - and the requirements for - emergency aid, the extent of damage to villages and towns, the level of public support the LTTE has etc., are being made difficult to assess.

However, the Sri Lankan government's censorship is largely being ignored by many international governments as an acceptable part of war strategy, as they have followed the same wartime policies