Till the other side cracks

[TamilNet, Tuesday, 12 May 1998, 23:59 GMT]
The Sri Lankan military's widespread and indiscriminate use of artillery and air power is arguably the major cause of civilian casualties in the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka. In the past few years, the Sri Lankan military has repeatedly up-gunned its forces with ever larger caliber field guns, with more numerous aircraft that are capable of carrying heavier payloads and more heavily armed naval craft.

The indiscriminate use of such weapons in the Tamil areas is reminiscent of tactics adopted by the US military in Vietnam - with similarly disastrous consequences for the resident civilian population.

The SLA uses artillery and air power extensively in the Vanni, where its troops are locked in a major battle with the Liberation Tigers. The SLA also uses these weapons in the eastern areas of the island and even in the Jaffna peninsula (which is ostensibly under SLA control) where the LTTE is also active.

In the east, artillery is used to harass Tamil villages near SLA bases and in the vast hinterland controlled by the LTTE, and is often used as retaliation for attacks on SLA camps and patrols.

The indiscriminate fire kills and wounds civilians, destroys livestock, homes and schools and makes life sufficiently uncertain for the local Tamil populace that they are often willing to abandon their land and seek safer areas away from the SLA positions. (This also paves the way for the settlement of Sinhala colonists in the vacated areas, thereby making the migration irreversible.)

During the Vietnam conflict, the indiscriminate - and liberal - use of artillery and air strikes proved to a major factor in alienating the civilian populace from the Saigon government and in building support for the Viet Cong.

In some instances, US troops confronted by a single VC sniper in the region of a hamlet would call down air strikes or artillery, leveling the entire hamlet. The 'justification' was often that the hamlet residents must have been either the families of Viet Cong or were harbouring them, and as such were legitimate targets.

The South Vietnamese military believed that by such punitive strikes, the civilians could simply be terrorised out of supporting the guerrillas. According to Neil Sheehan, UPI correspondent in Vietnam, the pervasive attitude was "We'll teach these people a lesson. We'll show them how strong and tough we are".

The SLA adopts a similar approach in its fight against the LTTE. When Tamil villagers extend support to the LTTE, the hamlet is pounded. When the LTTE ambushes an SLA patrol, nearby villages are deliberately shelled. Of course, the chances of catching the LTTE fighters in the strikes are slim: they plan their withdrawal in advance.

The civilian areas of Thenmaradchi and Gurunagar in the Jaffna peninsula, for example, are often shelled by the SLA's Palaly base, in retaliation for LTTE attacks in Jaffna, as has been the case in recent LTTE activity in the peninsula.

Following the SLA's debacle at Mullaitivu in July 1996, SLA bases from Palaly and Elephant Pass in the north of the island to Batticaloa in the east launched furious shellfire on surrounding Tamil villages for days on end.

Last year, following major LTTE counter-attacks on the forces of Operation Jayasikurui at Thandikulam, Omanthai and Nedunkerni, civilian concentrations in the Vanni were subject to punitive shelling and bombing by the SLA and SLAF.

So how did the South Vietnamese government and military justify the attacks on civilian hamlets? Firstly, as a rule, a valid military target was always claimed to have been present in the strike: a VC arms factory, VC camps, VC personnel, or simply VC "structures".

The reports distributed to the international press (which was, naturally, largely kept out of the affected areas) claimed all air strikes were against "pre-planned" targets and that only VC "structures" were being hit. As Neil Sheehan put it, "this removed the distinction between a hut erected by the guerrillas or a peasant family's home - or for that matter a pig sty".

Taking this approach to its limits, the Rules of Engagement that in the areas which aircraft were authorised to attack, anyone on the ground who ran was a Viet Cong! The sight of a spotter or spy plane invariably caused all civilians to panic and flee - with inevitable consequences.

Similarly, the Sri Lankan military reports all attacks in the Tamil areas as strikes on "identified LTTE targets". Fishing boats shot up by the SLAF or SLN are listed as "Sea Tiger craft", fishing villages bombed by the SLAF are "Sea Tiger bases", and even civilians killed in such actions are "terrorists". The ban on correspondents entering the affected areas effectively prevents verification of such claims.

Though the SLAF does find and hit some LTTE camps, by and large, the targets struck are non-military and civilians continue to be killed and wounded in such attacks.

A typical example is the air strike on Vavunakulam church on 15 August 1997, in which SLAF Kfirs dropped four 250 kg bombs amongst Tamil refugees, killing ten people and wounding fifteen. The SLAF denied bombing a church and maintained that "identified enemy targets in Vanni" were attacked.

On 23rd March 1998, SLAF Kfirs blasted civilian areas in Vattakkachchi and Periyakulam, killing eight civilians (including a 50 year old woman), destroying tractors and houses. The SLA stated that "an LTTE forward base" was destroyed along with "vehicles, including tractors and a few thatched houses".

Secondly, the Saigon government maintained the "war is hell" theme. In other words, adopting the attitude that civilian casualties were inevitable in war. However, as Sheehan puts it, "it was not a question of some non-combatants, but a question of mostly non-combatants".

The indiscriminate use of artillery in civilian areas almost certainly results in large numbers of refugees. Whilst farmers the world over are stubbornly attached to their land, repeated shell or bomb attacks are powerful persuaders to quit. In Vietnam, at least 2 million South Vietnamese became refugees in their own homeland (25,000 also being killed by 'friendly fire').

In Sri Lanka, up to 1 million Tamils are displaced in several parts of the Tamil territories. According to Batticaloa MP, Joseph Pararajasingham, the "Indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas from army and police camps has resulted in the displacement of most of the civilians from their places of original habitation".

Abandoned hamlets and farms became a routine sight in large areas of South Vietnam as the conflict escalated. Whereas the same occurred in the environs of Omanthai, Nedunkerni, Puliyankulam, etc. as Operation Jayasikurui battled up the A9; in the east of the island, the vacated Tamil homes are often quickly taken over by Sinhalese colonists, under the protection of the SLA.

The establishment of free-fire zones in Vietnam was a major contributor to the mass displacement of people. In effect, the government declared large areas of (guerrilla controlled) territory as areas subject to attack without warning. The intention was to squeeze the civilians in the region out by 'fencing' it off and subjecting it to massive air and artillery strikes, while restricting medical supplies and food into it.

The net result was an inflow of civilians from the guerrilla controlled areas into those held by the government, thereby depriving the guerrillas of recruits, supplies and other support. A bonus for the government was the propaganda benefit of being able to claim that the civilians were "deserting" the Viet Cong.

The Sri Lankan military takes a similar approach in the Vanni region, which is largely under LTTE control, and is home to an estimated half a million Tamil civilians. The districts of Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar and much of Vavuniya district are under routine air and artillery attack, whilst food and medical supplies into these areas have been slowed to an intermittent trickle, according to the Government Agents, refugees and aid workers.

However, the refugees fleeing these areas are being channeled into large detention centres in Vavuniya and Mannar (recently the Defence Minister announced plans for the construction of a giant camp capable of housing 200,000 people). Conditions in these camps are abominable enough for some of the refugees to opt to return to the risky existence in the free-fire zones of the Vanni.

In areas subject to repeated artillery and air strikes, the Viet Cong taught the local populace to build air raid shelters close to their homes - which saved countless lives, and more to the point, won the VC more loyal supporters: Whilst the government was seemingly trying to wipe them out, the guerrillas were visibly trying to save lives, a powerful persuader if there ever was one.

Similarly, the LTTE also constructs air raid shelters and bunkers for the Tamil populace in the areas it controls (the Jaffna peninsula was littered with such constructions during the years the area was in LTTE hands - and under SLA/SLAF attack.

Provided sufficient warning was available (such as during gunship attack) these shelters were reasonably effective, though not against the SLAF's fast moving Kfirs and the SLA's long range guns which usually catch people in the open.

In contrast, in areas blockaded by the government, the Viet Cong's medical corps treated wounded civilians, organised shelter and food supplies, actions that - in the civilians' minds - backed the NLF's (National Liberation Front) declaration that it was a liberation movement.

Similarly, the LTTE runs the civil administration in the areas it controls, such as in the Vanni, keeping the hospitals and schools supplied and open, treating civilian wounded, etc., readily winning hearts and minds (which, as the adage goes, live in bodies).

Sheehan says "the soldiers to fill the [the guerrilla movement's] ranks and the political climate to sustain it with vigor were also being created by the constant bombing and shelling".

Defenders of the Sri Lankan military maintain that the civilian casualties are a result of poor training, a lack of experience and insufficient equipment and do not indicate an underlying contempt for the lives of civilians.

However, the deliberate attacks on temples, churches and schools, in which artillery and air strikes land unerringly in the midst of civilian concentrations does not bear this out. The bombing of St. Peters Church in July 1995, Nagarkovil school in 1995 are two examples in which SLAF aircraft pointedly bombed clearly identifiable civilian targets (the school children dressed in spotless white being unmistakable from the air), killing hundreds of people.

During Operation Sath Jaya in August 1996 to capture Kilinochchi, the SLA destroyed most of the town in shelling and bombing, according to ICRC workers. Notably, even Kilinochchi hospital came under sustained shellfire, forcing the ICRC and Medecins Sans Frontier staff there to join the rest of the town and flee for other areas.

In a statement made to the United Nations in April 1997, a coalition of 53 NGOs said "the civilian Tamil population continues to be a target of military operations, including intensive aerial bombardment, by the Sri Lankan forces."

Despite the concerns of some US military officials and many other observers, the South Vietnamese government - and the US military - persisted in the use of artillery and air strikes in areas with large civilian concentrations. They believed, as one US officer, Brigadier William DePuy, put it, "the solution to Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm till the other side cracks and gives up".

The Sri Lankan military seems set on a similar approach in the Tamil areas.